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where, in order to get an analytical solution to a
model, the author has to assume away almost
every interesting feature of the problem to the
point that the remaining model is uninteresting
and uninformative. But that at least qualifies the
paper for possible publication in Econometrica,
RESTud, or JET.
Come on, give it a go. The book takes less time
than two NFL football games and has more
excitement and action.
James R. Markusen
University of Colorado at Boulder
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Schelling’s Game Theory: How to Make
Decisions. By Robert V. Dodge. Oxford and
New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp.
xii, 292. $39.95. ISBN 978–0–19–985720–3.

JEL 2012–0365
A few years ago, I attended a conference with
an unusual format. Speakers presented research
papers of other attendees, rather than their own.
This worked surprisingly well. It is enlightening
to see the points that presenters other than the
author emphasize, the ancillary bits a disinterested person appends, and the ease with which
a person can “kill one’s darlings” when they are
not, in fact, his darlings. Is something lost in the
translation? Of course. But we are not necessarily
worse off. Especially when trying to broaden the
work’s appeal.
Something analogous is going on with Robert
Dodge’s new book, Schelling’s Game Theory:
How To Make Decisions. Dodge is a Schelling
biographer (The Strategist, 2006) who teaches
at a private high school in Singapore. He was a
student in Schelling’s “Conflict, Cooperation and
Strategy” course at the Kennedy School, and
later adapted the course for his own students
with the goal of bringing Schelling’s methods to
a more general audience. This book is an extension of that effort. Schelling assisted by making
his course materials available to Dodge, and he
happily endorses the book as a “compendium of
a course that I taught for graduates and undergraduates at Harvard for thirty years and at the
University of Maryland for fifteen.”

Dodge clearly is a practiced presenter of
Schelling’s work, and of game theory more generally. His explanations are accessible enough for
novices but meaty enough for all but the most
advanced readers. The book covers the foundations of game theory—from basic strategic concepts through workhorse, two-player models
and eventually to group decisions and outcomes.
In most cases, this coverage has a Schellingesque slant, whether due to the contribution of
Schelling’s own work or through his illustrations
and historical detours. Dodge even includes some
practice problems from Schelling’s course, as well
as the famous questionnaire from his earliest
coordination experiments (which Vince Crawford
once suggested marked the beginning of experimental economics).
To bring this kind of source material to a broader
audience is a great cause. Dodge enhances that
contribution by adding considerably to Schelling’s
material. Most surprisingly via extended excerpts
from other published works, including Robert
Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation, Dixit and
Nalebuff’s Thinking Strategically, and Tim
Harford’s The Logic of Life, as well as articles
from Paul Krugman, Steven Levitt, and John
A. Paulos. These are an unexpected delight. If
Dodge’s book is a course on game theory, these
authors are guest lecturers. It’s takes humility to
step aside for guest lecturers. But typical of anytime one can find guest lecturers of this quality,
the “students”—Dodge’s readers—benefit.
The Axelrod excerpt is notable because Dodge
not only quotes his classic book extensively, he
includes personal correspondence with him.
Through this we hear Axelrod on the problem of
noise for a Tit-for-Tat strategy, a discussion that
concludes with his stating a preference for Tit-forTat with “a little generosity or contrition.”
Dodge uses such exchanges throughout the
book. We learn directly from Singapore’s Prime
Minister, Lee Hsien Loong, about the influence
of Schelling’s tipping point research on the country’s efforts to fight segregation. We hear from
Robert McNamara, Ted Sorensen, and Sergei
Krushchev (Nikita Krhuschev’s son) about strategic interaction in the Cuban Missile Crisis. And
we hear from Siddharth Mohandas, a one-time
editor at Foreign Affairs, of Schelling’s use of
game theory when pushing a manuscript through

Book Reviews
the editorial process. “The episode only increased
my respect for the man,” Mohandas said. “He
practices what he preaches!”
As much color as these additions bring,
Dodge’s greatest contribution is weaving
Schelling’s contributions and history throughout his discussion of game theory. This allows
themes connecting Schelling’s work to emerge
over the course of the book. We see how rooted
Schelling is in real-world phenomena, and how
that rootedness improves his theory. We see in
his surprising conclusions that outcomes both
heroic and tragic can flow from rational actors.
And we see that despite this focus on rationality, he deeply appreciates the importance of the
irrational.
This focus on Schelling is as it should be. But
the reader senses there are corners of game theory, especially newer ones, where the light is simply not shown. It would have been nice to have
these corners outlined and acknowledged, even
if unelaborated, in order to position Schelling’s
work (and his course) in the full field as it stands
now.
But this kind of academic positioning is not
the objective of the book. Dodge has other contributions to make. Indeed, it is by going beyond
a standard telling of game theory that he crafts
a unique book. In doing so, Dodge succeeds in
rendering Schelling’s course for a general audience. The book’s format is closest to a text book,
and it would work well in that capacity in undergraduate programs and professional schools. But
its size, accessibility, and color make this format
easy to forget. There are many chapters and supplements that would stand alone as readings in
a broad range of classes. And anyone teaching
a course involving strategic behavior would find
the book useful for historical anecdotes and current examples.
Overall, Dodge’s book provides a solid introduction to game theory, more than expected
about the field’s history, and a nice overview of
Schelling’s work. In this effort, Dodge is a faithful steward of Schelling’s course, but not without
the trimming, shaping, and supplementing only
an outsider could provide. The result is a game
theory book unlike any other.
Cade Massey
University of Pennsylvania

193
D

Microeconomics
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Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xix, 202.
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In the last decades, the around-the-world transformation of public and private pension schemes
from defined benefit to defined contribution plans
has placed increased risk and responsibility on
participants. Coupled with the financial pressures
on pension systems brought on by an aging population and more recently the financial crisis, this
has meant that households today need to be much
more financially savvy to maintain their retirement security. So far, this has proved to be a challenge and the behavioral economics literature has
provided a number of clues to individual retirement behavior. In this book, Clark, Strauss and
Knox-Hayes take the analysis one step further and
challenge the standard economic model by integrating the impact of social and environmental
factors in participants’ financial decision making.
Chapter 1 sets the scene and describes the
development of pensions and the increased need
for financial decision making. The authors review
the literature and demonstrate that individuals
on average are risk averse, shy away from financial opportunities that are rational according to
theory and are not very good at using information. But the evidence also reveals a considerable
variation in financial literacy: 20 percent of the
population appears to have very poor knowledge
while 20 percent can be characterized as sophisticated investors. In between a group that at best
can be characterized as naïve investors, but who
are expected to be active and well-informed consumers of financial products. To further understand individual behavior in financial markets the
authors argue that is necessary to integrate the
environment in which individuals live: cultural and
societal interactions matter for how we make decisions as well as personal relationships. Chapter 2
presents the theoretical framework. The chapter
builds on the findings in behavioral economics but
add the interaction of environment and behavior.
In the following two chapters, the authors present empirical analysis using data from the United

